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Abstract
This study focuses on nuclear tourism, which flourished a decade ago in the Exclusion 
Zone, a regimented area around the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (Ukraine) established 
in 1986, where the largest recorded nuclear explosion in human history occurred. The 
mass pilgrimage movement transformed the place into an open air museum, a space that 
preserves the remnants of Soviet culture, revealing human tragedies of displacement 
and deaths, and the nature of state nuclear power. This study examines the impact of 
the site on its visitors and the motivations for their persistence and activities in the 
Zone, and argues that through photography, cartography, exploration, and discovery, 
the pilgrims attempt to decode the historical and ideological meaning of Chornobyl 
and its significance for future generations. Ultimately, the aesthetic and political space 
of the Zone helps them establish a conceptual and mnemonic connection between the 
Soviet past and Ukraine’s present and future. Their practices, in turn, help maintain 
the Zone’s spatial and epistemological continuity. Importantly, Chornobyl seems to 
be polysemic in nature, inviting interpretations and shaping people’s national and 
intellectual identities.
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An open air museum involves the resurrection of old buildings and the re-creation 
of past landscapes and cultures for educational purposes. The idea was born in 
Scandinavia, in Oslo in the early 1880s, through Oscar II’s simple collection of old 
farm buildings. The concept spread to Norway and Sweden as an attempt to preserve 
a vanishing agrarian way of life before industrialization and urbanization would sweep 
its remnants into oblivion.2 Over approximately 150 years, open air museums developed 
rapidly and today exist on every continent except South America in a rich variety of 
forms. One of the objectives of such museums is to bring the past closer to their visitors, 
inviting them to experience it and to compare it with the present.
1 I would like to thank Serhii Plokhy, Dale A. Bertelsen, and anonymous reviewers for their 
thoughtful comments at earlier stages of this research.
2 Sten Rentzhog, Open Air Museums: The History and Future of a Visionary Idea (Stockholm: 
Carlssons; Ostersund: Jamtli, 2007), 152.
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From its inception the movement of creating these types of cultural institutions 
has been criticized for the absence of authenticity and accuracy in recreating the past. 
Such museums, the critics argue, will always remain a simulation of life in another 
time, and simulations often drastically differ from the realities of the past. Yet there is a 
more optimistic view, according to which open air museums function as powerful time 
machines that intellectually and emotionally transport people into the past, enabling 
them to engage in an experiential interpretation of history and in unique learning 
experiences.3 The Swedish art historian Sten Rentzhog has posited that these cultural 
institutions serve as bridges between generations, sanctioning historical and cultural 
continuity.4
There are also other sorts of open air museums that are more authentic than those 
that simulate a period in history, although they can only be identified as museums 
with caution and reservations. Some emerge spontaneously, from custom and practice, 
rather than from a conscious effort and desire to create them. For example, abandoned 
sites of nuclear disasters, such as Chornobyl, emerged as open air museums that have 
become monuments to human recklessness, neglect, and violence, and reminders about 
the dangers of technological innovations. Altered and modified by time and human 
activities, these dead zones nevertheless present unique opportunities to observe 
and experience the past. They are not cultural institutions, although some practices 
within them were institutionalized and regimented. These sites were abandoned, not 
re-created, and this major difference prompts us to refer to them as museums only 
conditionally, in a metaphorical sense.
What makes these sites museums is their visitors. Traditional open air museums 
attract audiences through advertisements and the activities of their organizers. The 
sites of nuclear disasters are typically silent, although their aesthetic and political 
(representational) space speaks to us in many voices. The paths toward them are 
investigated, discovered, and carefully chosen because they are not always legal. But 
what definitely unites conventional open air museums and spontaneous ones, such as 
Chornobyl, is their ability to facilitate intimate discoveries, including self-identification 
and people’s role and place in history. Through the eyes of an intellectual, an artist, 
a writer, or a photographer, the historical artifacts and material culture of open air 
museums are transformed into art, and Chornobyl has been no exception.5 They speak 
to us, as any art does, enabling us to remember, learn, and discover.
The American scholar Jeffrey K. Smith has argued that in the process of looking 
at a work of art in a museum, people somehow bring themselves into the picture, 
personalizing their experiences and associatively reflecting on something that once 
3  Jay Anderson, Time Machines: The World of Living History (Nashville, TN: American Association 
for State and Local History, 1984). 
4 Rentzhog, Open Air Museums, 409.
5 See, for instance, “The Chernobyl VR Project” that allows us to virtually and vividly observe 
the Chornobyl site at The Farm 51, July 1, 2016, accessed August 17, 2018,  
http://www.thefarm51.com/projekt/chernobyl-vr-project/.
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happened in their lives. The museum walls and their art talk with us and we react by 
returning to our past, which is often forgotten and otherwise irretrievable.6 Art stimulates 
and rejuvenates memories (or our perceptions) of the past, which are a museum in their 
own right — a “museum of abandoned (or forgotten) secrets,” as Oksana Zabuzhko has 
defined them.7 What one sees in a work of art can tell us a great deal about a person. The 
“art as mirror” concept is ancient and serves as a perfect model for explaining people’s 
dispositions, beliefs, and values, as well as the role and functions of museums, libraries, 
and other cultural institutions.8 They offer us myriad opportunities: they function as 
time machines, transporting us to our past; 9 they help us better understand ourselves; 
or on the contrary, they might confuse us more as distorted carnival mirrors, presenting 
images of the past uglier or funnier than they were in reality.
The distinction, however, between conventional and spontaneous open air 
museums is much more serious and profound than it might seem at first glance. 
Historically and philosophically, organized exhibitions and museums function as 
spectacle and surveillance places, as cultural sociologist Tony Bennett has posited.10 
The aesthetics and beauty of big open spaces are mesmerizing and undeniable, but 
they are also the spaces where visitors can see everything and be seen by everyone, and 
this disciplinary factor, combining with the visionary effect, contributed to Bennett’s 
concept of the “exhibitionary complex,” which alludes to the model of the Panopticon 
created by Jeremy Bentham and explained by Michel Foucault.11 The reasonable privacy 
of spontaneous open air museums excludes outright surveillance, and their visitors 
have extreme freedom in intimately experiencing and observing places and their 
landscapes, breathing new life into their material culture, and assigning new meanings 
to objects located within their space.
Their privacy of course is relative, especially lately, when the commercialization 
of nuclear sites and nuclear tourism has become commonplace, and more and more 
people attempt to penetrate the zone of tragedy and technological failure, illegally 
crossing the borders between the “normal” and “morbid” worlds, established by the 
authorities. Having penetrated the zone, one deals largely with the frozen and lifeless 
space of time and destruction, which minimizes regimentation and the effect of 
“panopticism,” associated with self-monitoring and self-regulation.12 In spontaneous 
6 Jeffrey K. Smith, The Museum Effect: How Museums, Libraries, and Cultural Institutions Educate 
and Civilize Society (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2014), 87.
7 Oksana Zabuzhko, Muzei pokynutykh sekretiv [A Museum of Abandoned Secrets] (Kyiv: 
Spadshchyna, 2012).
8 Smith, The Museum Effect, 87–89.
9 For an elaboration of this metaphor, see Anderson, Time Machines.
10 Tony Bennett, The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory, Politics (London: Routledge, 1995), 59–88.
11 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1995), 195–228.
12 Beyond Bennett, for a thought-provoking discussion about the effects of exhibitions and 
panopticism, see Simon Gunn, History and Cultural Theory (London: Pearson Education 
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open air museums, such as Chornobyl, external and internal control is replaced by self-
observation and contemplation. Importantly, unlike conventional open air museums, 
nuclear sites tell a story of destruction, not progress. For many Ukrainian nuclear 
tourists and “stalkers,” 13 Chornobyl also tells the story of Soviet imperial subversion, 
rejuvenating their national consciousness and contributing to their new national 
identities. Tranquilized by time, the secrets of the past beckon them, inviting them to 
commit to routine and frequent pilgrimages to the Chornobyl Zone. Their trips have 
transformed the Zone into an open air museum that persistently induces a polysemic 
exploration of institutional power and inner self.
A close focus on this truly mass pilgrimage that has made many young Ukrainians 
conscious of their past will help illustrate this point. Among the Zone’s visitors are 
young Ukrainian students, scholars, writers, and artists, people who have written a 
spatial history of Chornobyl, who have challenged the official narrative of the tragedy, 
and have created its “emotional cartography.” 14 They sought their childhood memories 
and the secrets of the past at the site of the nuclear disaster, simultaneously discovering 
something new for themselves — their new self-identifications and freedom.
The sections that follow provide the historical context of the emergence of 
Chornobyl as a spontaneous open air museum, offer a discussion of the reasons 
behind the Ukrainian pilgrimage to the Zone that surrounds the Chornobyl Nuclear 
Power Plant (AES), and examine the role and the meaning of Chornobyl for a young 
generation of Ukrainians who became frequent visitors there over the last decade.
Limited, 2006), 94–96.
13 Initially, the notion of a “stalker” emerged in Arkady and Boris Strugatsky’s science fiction novel 
Piknik na obochine (Roadside Picnic), published in Moscow’s journal Avrora in 1972 (the novel 
was translated into English by Antonina W. Bouis and was published in 1977 by the MacMillan 
Publishing Co., Inc., New York). The Strugatsky brothers borrowed this term from Rudyard 
Kipling’s novel Stalky & Co., a narrative about British school boys, adolescents whose “have 
been there” and “done it all” attitudes encouraged them to adopt cynical views about authority 
and patriotism. Despite the somewhat violent and hooligan nature of the main character 
Stalky, he also exhibited noble and kind features. This notion gained a new meaning in Andrei 
Tarkovsky’s film Stalker (1979). Stalker was a slightly mad individual, obsessed with his quest for 
truth and happiness who led groups of people to the “dead” Zone that was allegedly capable of 
healing people’s wounds and making them happy. Altruistic and kind by nature, Stalker helped 
other unhappy people like him reach the Zone’s “magic” room, where miracles had happened. 
Individuals who lead nuclear tourists to the Chornobyl Zone defined themselves as stalkers.
14 Kirill Stepanets, Denis Vishnevskii, and Sergei Paskevich, Chernobylskaia zona glazami 
stalkera [The Chornobyl Zone Through the Eyes of a Stalker] (Kyiv: Sky Horse Publishing House, 
2017); Chad Gracia, The Russian Woodpecker (documentary film; 2015); Markiian Kamysh, 
Oformliandiia abo prohulianka v zonu [A Formative Land, or A Walk to the Zone] (Kyiv: Nora-
Druk, 2015); see also Valerii Puzik’s interview with Markiian Kamysh in Litaktsent, January 5, 
2016, accessed August 18, 2018, http://litcentr.in.ua/blog/2016–01–05–78.
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Contextualizing the Disaster and Post-Disaster Realities
In the mid-sixties, inspired by the success of the Russian Federation in employing 
nuclear energy for its economic development, the first deputy head of the Ukrainian 
government and an enthusiastic supporter of this alternative source of energy, 
Oleksandr Shcherban, advocated the construction of new electric-power-generating 
facilities in Ukraine. In 1966 the search for a site that would suit the needs of the reactor 
was completed. The construction of the AES began in 1970 near the village of Kopachi, 
approximately 140 kilometers from Kyiv.15 In early December 1971, the highest party 
leadership in Moscow expressed their concerns about the slow tempo of construction 
and pressed the Politburo of Ukraine to intensify the process. Nuclear energy should 
have been tamed and utilized immediately, following the plans of rapid socialist 
construction envisioned by the center. The First Secretary of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of Ukraine (TsK KPU), Petro Shelest, called for an urgent 
meeting of the TsK KPU and the Council of Ministers of the UkrSSR (Rada Ministriv, 
RM hereafter) where the Chornobyl matter was to be discussed. Prominent Ukrainian 
writers were also invited to this meeting: Yurii Smolych headed the delegation that 
represented the Ukrainian Union of Writers. One intellectual sarcastically noted that 
those in Moscow accused Ukraine of dragging its feet, acting as if Ukraine was building 
a grocery store. The meeting produced a top secret resolution, signed by Shelest and 
the head of the RM, Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, which ordered “Kremenchukgesbud” 
to complete the construction of the AES as soon as possible. The Ministry of Energy of 
the USSR supervised the project.16
Yet Shcherbytskyi’s correspondence from late April to early June 1975 with 
Aleksei Kosygin, head of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and a member of the 
TsK KPSS, reveals that various Soviet factories failed to live up to their promises, and 
delivered no parts for the Zaporizhzhia and Chornobyl AESs on time. Shcherbytskyi 
requested assistance from Kosygin, who dumped this issue on the shoulders of his 
deputy, Veniamin Dymshyts. Dymshyts pressed all parties involved and, as a result, the 
Ukrainian party leadership promised him that the Chornobyl AES would be completed 
by August 27, 1975.17 The first two units were completed in 1977. Units 3 and 4 were 
launched in 1983.18 By 1983 four power units worked at full capacity, and the AES was 
staffed by residents of Prypiat, a town two kilometers north-west of Chornobyl.19
15 Serhii Plokhy, Chernobyl: The History of a Nuclear Catastrophe (New York: Basic Books, 2018), 31.
16 TsDAHOU 1/10/939/53–57.
17 TsDAHOU 1/25/1259/1–4.
18 V. Bar’yakhtar, V. Poyarkov, V. Kholosha, and N. Shteinberg, “The Accident: Chronology, Causes, 
and Releases,” in The Chornobyl Accident: A Comprehensive Risk Assessment by Victor Poyarkov 
et al., ed. George J. Vargo (Columbus & Richland, OH: Battelle Press, 2000), 5.
19 Iurii Shcherbak, Chernobyl: A Documentary Story, trans. Ian Press (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1989), 12. Shcherbak’s Chernobyl was published in Russian in the Soviet journal Yunost (in two 
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The explosion occurred in Unit 4 of the AES after midnight on April 25–26, 1986 
during the night shift, which supervised a series of experiments. The goal of these 
tests was to identify whether “the plant would respond to a turbine/generator trip 
concurrent with a loss of offsite power.” 20 The chronology of the tragedy and the reasons 
for it have been analyzed in hundreds of publications. Beyond the nuclear explosions, 
a prolonged fire contributed greatly to the level of destruction and the scale of the 
environmental disaster. The graphite moderator in the reactor core in Unit 4 caught 
on fire, and the graphite fire was finally extinguished on May 9, 1986, releasing into the 
atmosphere 4% of the nuclear material.21 Immediately after the explosions, through 
fallout, radioactive iodine-131 found its way into water supplies and food.22 The highest 
level of cesium soil contamination was registered in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. As a 
result, between the eighth and eleventh day after the explosion approximately 90,000 
people were evacuated from 170 towns, settlements, and villages. Within the next few 
weeks the total number of people who moved out of the area within a 30-kilometer 
radius around the AES (the “Exclusion Zone”) reached 135,000.23
Belarus suffered and continues to suffer the most because of its geographic 
specificity and the initial Western direction of the wind and precipitation. The highest 
radionuclide transport rates occur in areas with high moisture content. Belarus is famous 
for its forests and swamps, a factor that, among others, increased the vertical cesium 
distributions.24 Not surprisingly, the radionuclides contaminated 26% of Belarusian 
territories, 4.8% of Ukrainian lands, and 0.5% of Russian territories. Chornobyl forced 
issues in the summer of 1987) and also in Ukrainian in the Ukrainian journal Vitchyzna (in the 
spring of 1988).
20 Bar’yakhtar et al., “The Accident: Chronology, Causes, and Releases,” 9.
21 Bar’yakhtar et al., “The Accident: Chronology, Causes, and Releases,” 14.
22 According to several studies, people’s (especially children’s and adolescents’) exposure to 
small doses of I-131 is the major cause of thyroid cancer which develops due to residual tissue 
radiation damage caused by the radioisotope. Typically, people develop this type of cancer 
years after exposure, long after iodine-131 decays. See Steven L. Simon, André Bouville, and 
Charles E. Land, “Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests and Cancer Risks,” American Scientist 
94 (2006): 48–57; “Fallout Studies: Recent and Current Studies of Radioactive Fallout,” National 
Cancer Institute, 2017, accessed November 6, 2017, https://dceg.cancer.gov/research/what-we-
study/fallout-studies.
23 Zhores Medvedev, The Legacy of Chernobyl (New York; London: W. W. Norton & Company, 
1992), 151. On the evacuation issue and numbers of displaced people, see also David R. Marples, 
Chernobyl and Nuclear Power in the USSR (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), 141–46; and 
V. Poyarkov, “Introduction,” in The Chornobyl Accident: A Comprehensive Risk Assessment by 
Victor Poyarkov et al., ed. George J. Vargo (Columbus & Richland, OH: Battelle Press, 2000), 3.
24 V. Shestopalov and V. Poyarkov, “Environmental Contamination,” in The Chornobyl Accident: 
A Comprehensive Risk Assessment by Victor Poyarkov et al., ed. George J. Vargo (Columbus & 
Richland, OH: Battelle Press, 2000), 168.
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the evacuation of 485 Belarusian villages and towns, and every fifth Belarusian today 
lives on contaminated territory.25
Two hundred ten military units and approximately 340,000 people worked in the 
Zone near the reactor to remediate the consequences of the Chornobyl accident.26 
Approximately 117,000 workers built the “Shelter” (the sarcophagus) to prevent the 
radionuclides from spreading.27 The construction of the shelter came at an enormous 
price: the collective dose of radiation received by the workers was tremendous, and 
the shelter’s structural limitations were substantial.28 The remote-control equipment 
used on the site lacked precision, which resulted in gaps between the metal parts of 
the shelter. In other words, the sarcophagus has never been airtight, and the reactor 
continued to spew deadly radionuclides into the atmosphere. The liquidators dug out 
800 mounds and trenches within the Exclusion Zone where they buried contaminated 
animals, houses, equipment, trees, and soil.29 According to the official data, three people 
died on April 26, and twenty-eight more died from the effects of deadly radiation 
shortly after the explosion.
The Academy of Sciences in Moscow was ordered to urgently design a long-term 
plan for the decontamination of the AES and its adjacent territories. Today we have a 
number of explanations about the flaws of this plan but what is important is that the 
urgency of the situation and the plan of action were translated into several years of 
controversial tactics that negatively affected the lives of thousands, if not millions, of 
people in Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, and many European countries. During the first two 
years after the explosion, two-thirds of the decisions concerning Chornobyl were made 
by the Politburo in Moscow. Later on, its activities noticeably decreased. The Politburo’s 
control became extremely weak, and the task of social support for the Chornobyl 
community and of creating a comprehensive environmental program became a burden 
for many local Ukrainian officials.30 The Ministry of Energy of the USSR collected and 
processed information about radioactive contamination of the territories and the 
isotopic content of soil and water, but did little to use this information for alleviating 
25 Svetlana Alexievich, Chernobylskaia molitva: Khronika budushchego [Chernobyl Prayer: 
A Chronicle of the Future] (Moscow: Vremia, 2016), 6–7.
26 I. Los’ and V. Poyarkov, “Individuals: Accident Remediation Personnel and Public Doses,” in 
The Chornobyl Accident: A Comprehensive Risk Assessment by Victor Poyarkov et al., ed. George 
J. Vargo (Columbus & Richland, OH: Battelle Press, 2000), 181.
27 Victor Poyarkov, “Introduction,” in The Chornobyl Accident: A Comprehensive Risk Assessment 
by Victor Poyarkov et al., edited by George J. Vargo (Columbus & Richland, OH: Battelle Press, 
2000), 3. The construction of the Shelter began in May and was completed in November 1986.
28 V. Bar’yakhtar, V. Poyarkov, V. Kholosha, and V. Kukhar’, “The Shelter: Containing the Destroyed 
Reactor,” in The Chornobyl Accident: A Comprehensive Risk Assessment by Victor Poyarkov et al., 
ed. George J. Vargo (Columbus & Richland, OH: Battelle Press, 2000), 40.
29 Alexievich, Chernobylskaia molitva, 183.
30 TsDAHOU 1/2/1065/119.
Kyiv-Mohyla Humanities Journal 5 (2018)8
the consequences of the radiation or to help people who suffered from them; the 
statistics were top secret.31
More tragically, Moscow’s promises to help Ukraine alleviate the consequences 
of the disaster remained unfulfilled. The 23rd Party Congress emphasized that the 
Soviet government and its all-union budget would assume all expenses for the people’s 
relocation, the decontamination program, and medical assistance.32 A special account 
was created in the State Bank of the USSR, where funds were allotted specifically for 
the needs of the Chornobyl community and decontamination programs.33 Interestingly 
enough, after the collapse of the USSR, Russia inherited these funds (including the 
party money, as well as many other assets) that were officially the property of the Union 
and the three affected republics, not the RSFSR alone.34 There were numerous attempts 
by Ukrainian activists to trace the disappearance of these funds, but to no avail.
Activists also grew skeptical about the official version of the causes of the accident, 
formulated in the July 14, 1986 resolution of the TsK KPSS. According to the conclusions 
of the State Commission that created the foundation for this resolution, the explosion 
was the result of the incompetence and irresponsibility exhibited by the leadership 
of the Chornobyl AES.35 Moscow also blamed the regional Ministries for not paying 
attention to their cadre policies and their unsatisfactory work in implementing party 
tasks to ensure the nuclear power plant’s safe work regime.36
Assessments by leading Ukrainian scientists specializing in nuclear power plants 
differed somewhat from the official version. They added another dimension to the 
causes of the tragedy, arguing that the design flaws in the reactor control and protection 
system (RCPS) were known before the tragedy, and those who operated the reactor 
31 Liubov Kovalevskaia, Chernobyl. “DSP.” Posledstviia Chernobylia [Chornobyl. “DSP.” 
The Consequences of Chornobyl] (Kyiv: Abris, 1995). Also available at Chernobyl. Pripiat: 
Obo vsiom ponemnogu, February 7, 2012, accessed August 17, 2018, http://pripyat-city.ru/
books/178-chernobyl-dsp.html.
32 TsDAHOU 1/2/1065/128.
33 TsDAHOU 1/11/1374/18.
34 Similarly, the Union’s assets in the form of properties abroad, residences of Soviet embassies 
and consulates, were appropriated by the Russian Federation after 1991 through manipulation 
and blackmail. See, for instance, the first Soviet and Russian Ambassador to Israel Aleksandr 
Bovin’s account about the process of appropriation of the Soviet Consulate in Tel Aviv and 
preventing Ukraine from decisive steps in claiming the rights to the property. Aleksandr Bovin, 
5 let sredi yevreev i midovtsev, ili Izrail iz okna rossiiskogo posolstva (iz dnevika) [Five Years 
Among Jews and MID People, or Israel From a Window of the Russian Embassy (From the Diary)] 
(Moscow: Zakharov, 2000).
35 The State Commission was created on the second day after the accident. The deputy head of 
the Council of Ministers of the USSR Boris Shcherbina was appointed its chair.
36 TsDAHOU 1/11/1398/24. On the most recent interpretations of the Chornobyl disaster, see 
Plokhy, Chernobyl and Sonja D. Schmid, Producing Power: The Pre-Chernobyl History of the Soviet 
Nuclear Industry (Inside Technology), 1st ed. (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2015).
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relied largely on their experience and intuition rather than on the instruments’ objective 
data.37 In addition, they criticized the work on the shelter and its fundamental structural 
weakness. They suggested that unless serious urgent measures were undertaken that 
would prevent another nuclear disaster, its roof might eventually collapse, forming a 
radioactive dust cloud.
Some insisted that people’s incompetence and the reactor’s design flaws were 
exacerbated by general chaos and the absence of a single agency responsible for the 
decision-making process. The Soviet system in which everyone in the government and 
various institutions was responsible for everything produced a situation in which no one 
was responsible for anything.38 Mechanisms of accountability were never established: 
in fact, they were deliberately obscured by central and regional party leaders who, 
wishing to be in charge, delegated and dispersed their powers and responsibilities 
through a maze of bureaucratic channels and hierarchies. As Harvard professor Serhii 
Plokhy has posited, beyond the irresponsibility of station personnel who violated 
procedures and safety rules, the catastrophe’s “roots lay in the interaction between 
major flaws in the Soviet political system and major flaws in the nuclear industry.” 39
Many claim that the predictions of journalist Liubov Kovalevska, who before the 
explosion worked for the Prypiat newspaper Trybuna enerhetyka (The Energy Worker 
Tribune), were striking. She seemed to predict the accident by stressing in writing the 
enormous degree of incompetence and nepotism that had blossomed at the nuclear 
plant long before the tragedy. Because of special perks and privileges offered to the 
operators of the reactor, it was virtually impossible to be hired there unless those 
interested in a position had a sponsor. A system of acquaintances and dynasties was 
firmly in place which greatly affected the quality of people’s performances.40
Since 1986, thousands of reports, accounts, and studies have been published 
about Chornobyl and about the heroism of the liquidators. In some major way, their 
authors reached a consensus pertaining to the causes of the accident and the colossal 
degree of damages caused by radiation. In 2005, in the translator’s preface to Svetlana 
Alexievich’s oral history of Chornobyl, Keith Gessen posited that “no one intentionally 
set it [Unit 4] off.” 41 This view was confirmed by the official conclusion offered by the 
State Commission on Chornobyl and was established as a fact which has been engraved 
in the historiography of Chornobyl.
37 Bar’yakhtar et al., “The Shelter,” 74; Bar’yakhtar et al., “The Accident: Chronology, Causes, and 
Releases,” 7–8; George J. Vargo, “Editor’s Foreword,” in The Chornobyl Accident: A Comprehensive 
Risk Assessment by Victor Poyarkov et al., ed. George J. Vargo (Columbus & Richland, OH: 
Battelle Press, 2000), xi.
38 Bar’yakhtar et al., “The Accident: Chronology, Causes, and Releases,” 16–17.
39 Plokhy, Chernobyl, 347.
40 Shcherbak, Chernobyl, 15–21.
41 Keith Gessen, “Translator’s Preface,” in Voices from Chernobyl: The Oral History of a Nuclear 
Disaster by Svetlana Alexievich, trans. Keith Gessen (New York: Picador, 2005), xi.
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Yet for some Ukrainians the scenario in which a poorly designed reactor was 
staffed with incompetent people provoked a new set of questions that suggested a 
more complex course of events that had preceded the explosion of Unit 4. The 2011 
research by Ukrainian physicist and scientist Mykola Kravchuk constitutes one of the 
most controversial studies written over the last decade that has implicitly affirmed 
that the explosion was not actually an accident but a deliberate act with a specific 
agenda. Interestingly enough, Kravchuk could not find anyone interested in publishing 
his research in Ukraine, finally publishing it in Moscow. In his work he challenged the 
view of nuclear power expert Grigori Medvedev who, although stressing the experience 
and competence of the reactor’s operators as crucial factors in preventing accidents, 
gravitated toward the version that explained the Chornobyl explosion through the 
reactor’s fundamental design flaws and imperfections.42 Kravchuk’s analysis of available 
information and sources has emphasized the human factor in the tragic events that 
unraveled during the night of April 25–26 and thereafter, and ultimately has suggested 
a close connection between the odd behavior of the operators of the AES and their 
supervisors in Moscow.43 In other words, Kravchuk has argued that the explosion 
might not have occurred without a very specific plan of action conceived at the highest 
level and later implemented.44 Curiously, the popular feeling that the disaster was an 
intentional plan implemented successfully on April 26, 1986 was formulated by many 
of those who worked at the AES immediately after the tragedy, but this idea remains 
unsubstantiated by any credible evidence.45
This scenario, however, has been recently reinforced by an independent 
investigation conducted by Fedir Oleksandrovych, a Kyivite artist and a nuclear tourist, 
whose frequent visits to the Chornobyl Zone provoked his interest in the logistics and 
reasons behind the tragedy. His research is built on circumstantial evidence, and it is 
certainly doubtful for many reasons that his argument might be advanced and supported 
by more solid evidence in the future. Nevertheless, people like Oleksandrovych ask 
42 Grigori Medvedev, The Truth about Chernobyl, trans. Evelyn Rossiter (New York: Basic Books, 
Inc., 1991), 258–59. Medvedev’s Chernobylskaia khronika was published in Russian in Moscow 
in 1989.
43 Nikolai Kravchuk, Zagadka Chernobylskoi katastrofy (Opyt nezavisimogo 
issledovaniia) [The Mystery of the Chornobyl Catastrophe: Experience of Independent Research] 
(Moscow: “AIRO-XXI,” 2011), 15.
44 For the specific points of Kravchuk’s explanations, see Kravchuk, Zagadka, and Nikolai 
Kravchuk (interview with Anastasiia Kozlova), “Tragediia v Chernobyle byla umyshlena! 
[The Tragedy at Chornobyl Was Planned!],” Newsland, July 23, 2013, accessed August 
17, 2018, https://newsland.com/community/88/content/tragediia-v-chernobyle-byla-
umyshlena/2207091. Kravchuk seems to believe that the Politburo and the new leadership in 
the Kremlin, those who encouraged Gorbachev’s perestroika, might have come up with the 
plan to blow up the AES to undermine the integrity of the USSR, a development that might 
eventually lead to its demise.
45 Alexievich, Chernobylskaia molitva, 16.
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legitimate questions about the roots of the tragedy, ultimately placing Chornobyl 
in the category of mysteries that “awaits decoding,” a “mystery for the twenty-first 
century,” as the Belorussian journalist and writer Alexievich has suggested.46 Many 
of those in Ukrainian society, who suffered in the past and continue to suffer today 
from psychological trauma and serious medical conditions caused by displacement, 
radiation, and social and psychological entrapment, continue to express doubts about 
the accidental nature of the disaster. Anastasiia Zanuda, for instance, has suggested that 
at the very least, one should speak of the “entirely predictable” nature of Chornobyl.47
Regardless of the nature and origin of these views, Alexievich’s 2015 Nobel Prize 
Award in Literature and her work on Chornobyl, and American film director Chad 
Gracia’s film The Russian Woodpecker reinvigorated popular and scholarly interest 
in the Chornobyl accident and its consequences.48 Importantly, the mass pilgrimage 
movement and new Ukrainian art and literature on nuclear tourism were provoked 
by Ukrainian youth’s initial interest in the horror computer game S. T. A. L. K. E. R., 
a project of the Ukrainian video game company “GSC Game World” and its founder 
Sergei Grigorovich, who developed this game for Microsoft Windows. The real events 
in Chornobyl, photographic images of the Zone, and the Strugatsky brothers’ ideas 
served as the foundation for this game and the reasons for the international success 
of the product.49 When young people had finally satiated their hunger and interest in 
the virtual game, they were desperate to see its blueprint — the real site of Chornobyl.
Thousands of young Ukrainians “populated” the Zone, contributing greatly to the 
formation of a phenomenon — a routine pilgrimage to the Zone, which for many grew 
into an obsession. Some used official tour guides; others chose illegal paths to penetrate 
the Zone, employing the stalkers’ service. Stalkers (or “samokhody,” or ‘illegals,” or 
“nuclear tourists”) became a widespread term identifying those who illegally travel to the 
Zone and explore various sites there.50 In contrast to other illegals who live off the Zone, 
stealing metal and other items abandoned in the 1980s, most stalkers pursue other than 
46 Alexievich, Chernobylskaia molitva, 31.
47 Anastasiia Zanuda, “Chornobyl-30: spohady, zasvidcheni arkhivamy KDB [Chornobyl-30: 
Memoirs Confirmed by the KGB Archives],” BBC Ukraina, April 25, 2016, accessed August 
17, 2018, http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/society/2016/04/160419_chornobyl_kgb_archives_
memories_az.
48 “The Nobel Prize in Literature 2015 (Svetlana Alexievich),” Nobelprize.org, 2015, accessed August 
13, 2018, https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2015/; Gracia’s film 
was among the 2015 Sundance Film Festival award winners. See “2015 Sundance Film Festival 
Award Winners,” Sundance, 2015, accessed November 6, 2017, https://www2.sundance.org/pdf/
festival-info/2015AwardWinners.pdf.
49 The sales of the game (the circulation was approximately 5 million copies) reached more than 
$ 100 million; for a more detailed discussion about this computer game, see the interview 
of Grigorovich and the founder of the Sky Horse Publishing House Vladimir Nevzorov in 
Stepanets et al., Chernobylskaia zona, 370–90.
50 Stepanets et al., Chernobylskaia zona, 29.
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commercial purposes. What unites them is their appreciation of the Zone’s beauty and 
their gravitation towards creativity and self-expression. Many of them attempt to revisit 
the last days of the Soviet empire and its politics of silence. Remarkably, their efforts 
reveal the emergence of national consciousness among Ukrainian youth, inspired by 
anti-imperial and patriotic sentiments borne by state violence under Yanukovych, and 
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Their research, publications, and creative art speak 
volumes for their new identities, contributing greatly to scholarship on Chornobyl and 
shaping their unique voices in art, literature, and politics.
Chornobyl is crucial to our understandings of the political trends of late Soviet 
socialism and its influence on Soviet Ukrainian society,51 but it is equally important to 
assess how Chornobyl continues to shape the intellectual and ideological worlds of 
the citizens of independent Ukraine. The stalker movement and its products help us 
realize exactly that. Similarly, contemporary Western art and films illuminate concerns, 
insecurity, and people’s transformations associated with Chornobyl, which has never 
been a national but rather a global tragedy. The Polish artist Karolina Kowalczyk’s 
striking ability to rejuvenate the traditions of a Slavic paper-cutting folk art that dates to 
the mid-19th century immerse us in the world of the Chornobyl tragedy, a very personal 
matter for Karolina that triggers her painful memories and experiences.52 Gracia’s 
The Russian Woodpecker is another example of Western interest in post-Chornobyl 
realities and people’s identities in Ukraine. This film, which featured Oleksandrovych’s 
personal history, accentuated the evolution of a person’s views, perceptions, and art 
under Chornobyl’s influence. His story reverberated in the hearts of many around 
the world who experienced displacement, physical and psychological enclosure, and 
hardships associated with authoritarianism.53 Undoubtedly, Chornobyl helped many 
young Ukrainians identify some parallels between Soviet Ukraine and independent 
Ukraine, where secrecy, silence, and the non-transparency of political behavior played 
and continue to play a crucial role in people’s lives.
For many of them, the Exclusion Zone remains a magnet and a place to which 
they return in search of their past, their identity, and their freedom. Illegal tourism 
to the Chornobyl AES has blossomed since 1986, but those who travel to Chornobyl 
plundering people’s abandoned houses and ravaging industrial remnants of rusted 
machinery in search of spare parts and precious metals are deliberately left out of the 
51 On this topic, see Catherine Wanner, Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet 
Ukraine (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 27–33.
52 Chloe Riley, “For Polish Artist, Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster Hits Close to Home,” Chicago 
Tonight, April 18, 2016, accessed August 13, 2018, https://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2016/04/18/
polish-artist-chernobyl-nuclear-disaster-hits-close-home; see also Karolina Kowalczyk’s art at 
her official site, accessed August 13, 2018, http://www.karolinaart.com/karolina-art.
53 Mariam Agamian, “Chad Grasia: Moi film ne o Chernobyle, a o cheloveke [My Film is not 
About Chornobyl but About a Person],” Ukrainska pravda, January 25, 2016, accessed August 17, 
2018, https://life.pravda.com.ua/culture/2016/01/25/206996/.
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picture. Their motives are transparent and less interesting than those of people who 
have transformed post-accident Chornobyl into an open air museum.
The Aesthetics and “Emotional Cartography” of the Zone
Chornobyl and Prypiat have become an attraction for many reasons and for many 
people, including non-Ukrainians. Today nuclear tourism is quite popular, and one 
can pay a fee to be brought to the Zone to observe the remnants of Prypiat and the 
Chornobyl AES. For instance, Andrew Leatherbarrow from Great Britain went on a 
trip to Chornobyl in late 2011, the 25th anniversary of the explosion, took hundreds 
of photographs and wrote a book about Chornobyl and his experiences in the Zone.54 
Many foreign tourists perceive the Zone as Terra Incognita, a place that has been 
romanticized, heroized and mythicized. Importantly, scholars create international 
teams and travel to irradiated forests surrounding the AES to explore the fire danger 
of large areas of the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone and its impact on health, and to analyze 
the trends in the rejuvenation of flora and fauna in the Zone.55
54 Andrew Leatherbarrow, “Chernobyl 01:23:40,” Leatherbarrowa.exposure.co, January 25, 2014, 
accessed August 17, 2018, https://leatherbarrowa.exposure.co/chernobyl.
55 One such initiative is the Chernobyl Irradiated Forest Wildfire Project which is run by scientists 
from Ukraine and Yale University with support from the Chopivsky Family Foundation. See 
Chad Oliver, “Chernobyl Narrative,” Campuspress (Yale University), accessed August 18, 2018, 
http://campuspress.yale.edu/chadoliver/cherno-narrative/.
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The Ukrainian pilgrimage (or stalkers movement) that includes predominantly 
young people began to develop clear contours approximately ten years ago, substantially 
growing within the last three or four years.56 The commercialization of the Zone, which 
was opened for official tourism about a decade ago, prompted various individuals to 
explore the Zone on their own, without restrictions and constraints imposed by the 
authorities. Despite the dangers of radiation and arrests by Zone security, they initially 
traveled to the Zone out of curiosity and for “romantic purposes,” to see Chornobyl’s 
sunrises and sunsets, unique in its beauty. The material culture of the Zone — abandoned 
industrial equipment and private properties, cemeteries of radioactive machines and 
animals, and houses and military objects — has always been the focal point for stalkers, 
an asset to be enjoyed and studied. One stalker has noted that the site and its material 
culture are “open air museums ready for its visitors. No one has to invest a penny in it; 
all is needed is the absence of thieves.” 57
According to the young scholar and stalker Kyrylo Stepanets, the Ukrainian 
community of stalkers should be identified as a community of “marginal” individuals 
who systematically travel to the Zone, neglecting their own comfort, health, and safety, 
developing and shaping a special sub-culture and behavioral codes. Experienced 
stalkers made more than 100 trips to the Zone, considering the place a “living creature 
that [would] never hurt them.” 58 They are well adjusted to the severe weather, social and 
legal conditions of the Zone, and demonstrate excellent survival skills. Their creativity 
and innovations prevent their feet from being frozen and their souls from being hurt.59 
Because of painful experiences of being detained by Zone security, the stalkers have 
also developed strategies that help them avoid encounters with the authorities. Today 
Zone security can no longer effectively control illegal nuclear tourism in the dead town 
of Prypiat, and its 12,000 abandoned apartments serve as temporary shelters for the 
stalkers.60
Many have emphasized that the perceptions of time are skewed in the Zone. 
Although the site of the disaster has changed beyond recognition over the last thirty 
years, the stalkers have an opportunity to observe a stroboscopic phenomenon of time 
flow in the dark cellars of the AES’s medical and other facilities, where the time and 
the events of April 26, 1986 seem to stop and are illuminated by the stalkers’ flashlights, 
vividly and thus horridly. The uniforms of the first firemen are still there.61 Indeed, having 
survived in Chornobyl, the material culture of Soviet times has dramatically changed 
the meanings and perceptions of time that affects people’s choices and behaviors. In 
urban space, time passes outrageously fast, often leaving people just an instant to make 
a decision. In contrast, Chornobyl imposes a slow, tranquil, and “infinite” rhythm, which 
56 Stepanets et al., Chernobylskaia zona, 29.
57 Stepanets et al., Chernobylskaia zona, 272.
58 Stepanets et al., Chernobylskaia zona, 26, 33.
59 Stepanets et al., Chernobylskaia zona, 43.
60 Stepanets et al., Chernobylskaia zona, 220.
61 Stepanets et al., Chernobylskaia zona, 47, 51.
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makes people think, compare, and reflect, as the columnist for the Ukrainian newspaper 
Den (Day) and the author of Oformliandiia, abo prohulianka v zonu (A Formative Land, 
or A Walk to the Zone) Markiian Kamysh has noted.62 Interestingly, Kamysh dismisses 
the term “Zone,” positing that “zones exist in our heads.” 63 For him, Chornobyl is not a 
means of demarcation between order and disorder but rather an experiential resort for 
the lonely. Kamysh has claimed that in the Zone he personally feels extremely lonely, 
and thus exceptionally comfortable and happy. Loneliness is for artists and writers, not 
for crowds. But even for crowds, Chornobyl may become a discovery of new faculties 
of time and rhythm.
This post-disaster rhythm of the Zone pleases tourists, many of whom become 
writers and philosophers. Chornobyl and its rhythm encourage them to delve into the 
history of the place, awakening their creative impulses and enhancing their literary and 
artistic talents. They seem to be nurtured by the mysterious silence of the place, which 
divulges human suffering and death. People like Kamysh and Oleksandrovych, who 
approach the site closely, produce “living and pulsating literature” and breathtaking 
images of Chornobyl, not letting its civilization die.64 Importantly, the expressions of 
their experiences appear genuine, and thus they are valid and cogent.65 Kamysh has 
been identified as a writer with a unique literary voice, and Oleksandrovych — as one 
of the best young Ukrainian artists.66
Their creativity and tragic voices grew out of their own and other people’s suffering 
in Chornobyl, a place which was transformed from a technological site into a machinery 
of destruction. Lina Kostenko has exclaimed: “Who sowed this asperity and who will 
harvest it?” (Khto siiav tsiu bidu i khto yii pozhne?). A new generation of Ukrainians 
have harvested this affliction that had been sown by their parents and grandparents. 
Yet after twenty trips to the Zone, their uncertainties and fear of radiation that used to 
penetrate their very consciousness, provoking a morose feeling of potential death, no 
longer bothers them. In some mysterious way, the Zone comforts them and stimulates 
their acute interest in both life and near death experiences. Consumed by mosquitoes 
and bitten by snakes, they travel to the Zone in nasty weather and bravely drink from 
the puddles near the deadly reactor.67 Despite the hardships of pilgrimage, these 
62 Kamysh, Oformliandiia, 73.
63 Kamysh, Oformliandiia, 73.
64 Sofiia Andrukhovych, Cover page of Oformliandiia abo prohulianka v zonu by Markiian Kamysh 
(Kyiv: Nora-Druk, 2015).
65 For an enlightening discussion about the genuineness and validity of human expressions and 
experiences, see Isaiah Berlin, “Herder and the Enlightenment,” in The Proper Study of Mankind: 
An Anthology of Essays by Isaiah Berlin, eds. Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000), 389.
66 Andrukhovych, Cover page; “V Kieve otkryvaetsia vystavka luchshykh molodykh khudozhnikov 
Ukrainy [Opening of an Exhibition of the Best Young Artists of Ukraine],” Fokus, December 1, 
2010, accessed August 17, 2018, https://focus.ua/society/158560/.
67 Stepanets et al., Chernobylskaia zona, 33, 43.
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experiences reassert their feeling of freedom and erase uncertainties. The desolate 
town of Prypiat evokes nostalgia for the past in those who were born, raised, and once 
happy there. The site exemplifies their “semi-forgotten childhood and ‘happy Soviet 
youth.’” 68 “For us, the pilgrimage to Prypiat is equally sacred as a Muslim’s trip to Mecca,” 
Stepanets has asserted.69
Neither fines nor arrests seem to prevent stalkers from appreciating the aesthetics 
of the Zone: “the sun shines over the dead town for everyone, but the grandeur of 
the sunrises belongs only to the stalkers.” 70 To reach a place abandoned and forgotten 
by people, which still stores their possessions, the stalkers are not hesitant to wade 
through the tangled forests of the Zone that have overgrown railway tracks, houses, 
huts, and entire villages. Rusty metal beds in a former Soviet pioneer camp and 
the silence of empty villages and huts are sad and depressing, but according to the 
stalkers, their sadness is very quickly replaced with the comfort and tranquility the 
place conveys. Silence seems to have a therapeutic affect on the confused mind and 
physically exhausted body, and precisely this emotional dissonance invites the stalkers 
to return to the Zone.71
Yet for many stalkers like Kamysh, who were born to families of Chornobyl 
liquidators, the Zone has become a place where the “phallic” Chornobyl pipe (truba) 
(its weight was 350 tons and its height — 150 meters) symbolizes nuclear catastrophes 
and personal tragedies, reminding them of their mortality and potential sudden 
death.72 Simultaneously, the Zone is a symbol of manhood, where their fathers matured 
together, saving the world from catastrophe. The French philosopher Henri Lefebvre 
has argued that there is something intriguing and magnetic in the “phallic verticality” 
of landscapes, which has a long history of being imbedded in any space and place. 
He has insisted that this phenomenon, at the very least, should be explained.73 Truba, 
the highest ventilation pipe rising over Unit 4, was demolished in late 2013, having 
survived only in documentaries, photos, and memories. For many stalkers the “fall” 
of the main symbol of the Zone’s tragedy depleted the place in many ways, and they 
even quit traveling to the Zone. Yet at the mercy of feelings of urgency and nostalgia, 
they renewed their trips to the Zone. The vanished artifact encouraged the stalkers 
to establish new social practices to facilitate further investigation of the Zone and its 
“sacred” places, ultimately shaping a new space and geography of their pilgrimage.74 
68 Kamysh, Oformliandiia, 7; see also Stepanets’s discussion about the aesthetics of Prypait in 
Stepanets et al., Chernobylskaia zona, 232–36, 241–45, 252–55.
69 Stepanets et al., Chernobylskaia zona, 255.
70 Stepanets et al., Chernobylskaia zona, 80.
71 Stepanets et al., Chernobylskaia zona, 132–33, 146.
72 Kamysh, Oformliandiia, 8–9, 13.
73 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford, UK: Blackwell 
Publishing, 1991), 36.
74 Sergei Belov and Katerina Zotova, “Chernobylskaia truba ushla v istoriiu [The Chornobyl Pipe 
Receded into History],” Komsomolskaia pravda v Ukraine, January 9, 2014,  
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Nevertheless, they appear to be uncertain whether they travel to the Zone to resurrect 
their dearest past or to read their own future, where nuclear disasters such as Chornobyl 
are possible and even likely.
Importantly, most stalkers are convinced that Chornobyl liberates people from 
their fears, making them reject state and nuclear violence and inciting their political 
activism and longing for freedom. For instance, Kamysh argues that a habit of crossing 
the border of the “permissible” (in this case the physical border of the Zone where 
surveillance mechanisms were firmly established) helps people get rid of their inner 
fear of authorities and their disciplinary power. He anthropologized the concept of 
an open air museum, attributing to Chornobyl formative functions. Inside the zone’s 
borders, there is a space where surveillance is minimal, and thus freedom is real and 
“accessible.” Such a place, thus, shapes people’s dispositions and culture, taking them 
further away from the spaces of control and surveillance, which are inherently cruel 
and violent.75 The road to the Zone is as thorny as the road to freedom for Ukrainians, 
but, as another Ukrainian, filmmaker Myroslav Slaboshpytskyi, believes, these trips to 
the past are necessary because they are indeed trips to personal freedom and dignity.76
Politics as a Formative Factor of the Chornobyl Open Air Museum
Similar to many other thinkers, Lefebvre has argued that (social) spaces and places 
can never be apolitical. They are tools of thought and action, and a means of control, 
domination, and power.77 The state imposes itself on spaces and places, reasserting its 
abusive power over them, as well as over individuals and institutions that inhabit them. 
Although the state’s domination is often overarching and violent, it is never completed. 
Spaces and places are also populated by other forces, and “the violence of power is 
answered by the violence of subversion.” 78 In the case of Chornobyl, the stalkers 
have repopulated a desolated space and place, and the balance of perennial struggle 
between the state and the subverted has been restored. Thirty years after the tragedy, 
the cataclysmic past of the Zone, recreated in millions of photographs, amplifies the 
lethargic feeling of popular mistrust of the authorities. For people like Oleksandrovych, 
the landscape of Chornobyl and its surroundings served as a powerful stimulus for 
investigating the reasons behind the catastrophe. Unlike obliviousness, possible clarity 
and answers to the question “why” help them cope with their own trauma associated 
with temporary displacement from the city of their birth, Kyiv.
accessed August 14, 2018, http://kp.ua/economics/432091-chernobylskaia-truba-ushla-v-
ystoryui; Stepanets et al., Chernobylskaia zona, 322, 326.
75 Puzik’s interview with Kamysh.
76 Myroslav Slaboshpytskyi, “Literatura na lito [Literature for the Summer],” Chytomo, July 11, 
2016, accessed August 14, 2018, http://www.chytomo.com/books-for-summer/5-knig-yaki-radit-
prochitati-rezhiser-miroslav-slaboshpick.
77 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 26.
78 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 23.
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In addition, the politics of and around Chornobyl, experienced by at least three 
generations, facilitated the stalkers’ interest in the Zone. Many have become aware 
of the Soviet politics of silence, and a nationalist movement in Ukraine in the late 
1980s, triggered by Chornobyl. May 1986 became a “painful and difficult beginning of 
[people’s] liberation from the genetic sovok-like fear of power,” power that was anemic 
and powerless before another power — radiation, a superpower of destruction.79 For 
many in Ukraine, the authorities’ propaganda that appeared after Chornobyl and 
employed the Stalinist rhetoric of “enemies,” “saboteurs,” “the agents of foreign secret 
services,” and the necessity for “shock-work” had a contrary effect: it aggravated people 
and, as many scholars have argued, galvanized the people’s mistrust of the authorities 
that had been stimulated by inaccurate information and pure deception forced on 
them by the state.80 Information about Soviet “state nuclear violence” triggered similar 
processes among Ukrainian youth in the 2000s.81
The stalkers learned more about the self-sacrifice of the liquidators and read 
the heartbreaking poetry and prose about these tragic events written by prominent 
Ukrainian writers.82 They realized that for the liquidators the Zone had become a life-
transforming experience. Many of the liquidators who survived the consequences of 
radiation claimed that they began to think differently and reconsidered their identities 
and values: “Chornobyl exploded my brain. I began to think.” 83 Some began to think in 
philosophical categories, and notions such as space, place, and time became part of 
79 Oksana Zabuzhko, “Postskryptum: Monoloh perekladacha pro dzvin pokynutykh khramiv 
[Postscript: A Translator’s Monologue about the Bells of Abandoned Cathedrals],” in Vybrane 
lystuvannia na tli doby: 1992–2002 by Oksana Zabuzhko and Yurii Shevelov (Kyiv: Fakt, 2011), 474.
80 Serhy Yekelchyk, The Conflict in Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 60; Aliaksandr Dalhouski, Tschernobyl in Belarus: Ökologische Krise und 
sozialer Kompromiss (1986–1996) (Historische Belarus-Studien, Book 4) (Harrassowitz Verlag, 
2015); V. Poyarkov, V., V. Kholosha, and Yu. Saenko, “Society: Social Risks After the Accident,” 
in The Chornobyl Accident: A Comprehensive Risk Assessment by Victor Poyarkov et al., ed. 
George J. Vargo (Columbus & Richland, OH: Battelle Press, 2000), 206; Wanner, Burden of 
Dreams, 30; Jane I. Dawson, Eco-Nationalism: Anti-Nuclear Activism and National Identity in 
Russia, Lithuania, and Ukraine (Durham; London: Duke University Press, 1996), 69; Alexievich, 
Chernobylskaia molitva, 142, 144. On the role of Chornobyl in the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
see Serhii Trokhym, 1986: Chornobylski khroniky [1986: The Chornobyl Chronicles] (Brusturiv: 
Dyskursus, 2016).
81 The concept of “state nuclear violence” was offered by the Prypiat journalist Liubov Kovalevska. 
See Kovalevskaia, Chernobyl. “DSP.”
82 Among them were Lina Kostenko, Ivan Drach, Borys Oliinyk, Dmytro Pavlychko, Robert 
Tretiakov, Valentyna Kozak, Volodymyr Shovkoshytnyi, Leonid Talalai, Viktor Baranov, and 
Oksana Zabuzhko.
83 Alexievich, Chernobylskaia molitva, 32, 83. Interview with Iryna and Oleksandr, former 
liquidators and residents of Dniprorudnyi, Zaporizhzhia oblast, Ukraine (interview was 
conducted by the author on March 26, 2005).
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their lexicon, a phenomenon familiar to the stalkers.84 In 1986, the Earth had shrunk, 
being absorbed by a common human tragedy, and time became an acutely relative 
category which could be measured and simultaneously comprehended in radionuclides’ 
radioactive half-lives and human life-span terms: “He was 38 years old when he died 
because of ionizing radiation; the half-life of uranium-238 is about 4.47 billion years 
and that of uranium-235 is 704 million years.” 85 Michel Foucault would define this 
reality as medical uncertainty when the number and combination of probabilities 
which ensure certainty and affirm life are limited or often non-existent.86 The stalkers 
developed affinity with the Zone and its representations, internalizing human tragedies 
and experiencing similar medical uncertainty, using Foucault’s definition.
A great wealth of literature also made the stalkers realize that medical uncertainty 
had been a significant part of Soviet citizens’ lives. This perception had been largely 
shaped by the Soviet regime that had been employing medicine as a political tool for 
decades.87 Chornobyl further politicized medicine and science in the Soviet Union: 
84 Alexievich, Chernobylskaia molitva, 36, 39.
85 Alexievich, Chernobylskaia molitva, 141.
86 Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, trans. 
A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 116.
87 This popular belief has been substantiated by hundreds of publications and new archival 
discoveries. See DAKhO R 1962/1/138/1–2, 4–8, 17. For a discussion about the use of psychiatry 
for political purposes, see Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway, Soviet Psychiatric Abuse: The 
Shadow over World Psychiatry (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985); Alexander Podrabinek, 
Punitive Medicine, trans. Alexander Lehrman (Ann Arbor: Karoma Publishers, Inc., 1980); 
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programs to alleviate the medical conditions of the liquidators officially existed 
but radiation disease and acute radiation syndrome caused by Chornobyl were not 
acknowledged.88 The early accounts written by Yurii Shcherbak, Svetlana Alexievich, 
and Liubov Kovalevska provided the stalkers with a general picture of the disastrous 
environmental and medical consequences of Chornobyl. Moreover, these authors 
illuminated the social dimensions of the tragedy associated with broken families, 
displacement, and social inequalities, and the political reasons behind them — the 
Soviet state’s information blockade, concealment, and manipulation that cost people 
their lives and wounded their pride.
The stalkers’ interviews and publications reveal their acute awareness of Chornobyl 
politics and their close reading of literature published since 1986. Personal experiences 
and family memories augmented their commitment to pilgrimage and sharpened their 
national consciousness. In 1986, many Kyivites, including the Oleksandrovych family, 
made a decision to send their children away from the city to avoid their exposure 
to radiation. Tragically, being informed about its potential danger, Kremlin officials 
ordered Ukrainian authorities not to cancel the traditional May celebratory events. 
According to the Moscow party leadership, sowing panic among the Ukrainian 
population would problematize Soviet-Western relations. The order from Moscow to 
the Ukrainian party leadership stated that the May Day Parade in 1986 in Kyiv must 
be held without fail.89 Oblivious to the scale of the nuclear disaster that occurred in 
Kyiv’s backyard, people filled the central streets of Kyiv.90 As a result, on May 1 by 5:00 
PM 779 people, including 128 children, were hospitalized in Kyiv clinics. One hundred 
people were diagnosed with radiation disease.91 The tragic individual histories of 
these people are lost forever, as within days their records were falsified and they were 
officially categorized as generally healthy, although many of them were mortally ill. 
After Oleksandrovych’s parents learned about the accident, they made the decision to 
send their three-and-half-year-old son away from the deadly radiation in Kyiv to the 
“Solnyshko” sanatorium in Leningrad, a place that also sheltered orphans from various 
Robert van Voren, Cold War in Psychiatry: Human Factors, Secret Actors (Amsterdam; New York: 
Rodopi, 2010); the Vladimir Bukovsky Archive, Document 0202 (СT31/19) “About Psychiatric 
Care in the USSR” (February 18, 1972), 164; Olga Bertelsen, “Rethinking Psychiatric Terror against 
Nationalists in Ukraine: Spatial Dimensions of Post-Stalinist State Violence,” Kyiv-Mohyla 
Humanities Journal 1 (2014): 27–76.
88 Alexievich, Chernobylskaia molitva, 156.
89 As Edward Geist has shown, after April 27, 1986, the state and party leadership “continued to 
oppose taking necessary steps to protect the population.” See Edward Geist, “Political Fallout: 
The Failure of Emergency Management at Chernobyl’,” Slavic Review 74.1 (2015): 124.
90 The April 28, 1986 brief TASS announcement about the accident in Chornobyl that literally 
consisted of five sentences was missed by the majority of the population. An analysis of the 
subsequent deliberate attempt by Moscow to downplay the seriousness and the scale of the 
accident was offered in hundreds of publications on the topic.
91 TsDAHOU 1/25/2995/7.
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parts of the Soviet Union.92 Traumatized by the experience, he returned to Chornobyl 
thirty years after the tragedy to learn more about it and about himself.93
But it is not just the politics, the Soviet practices, and the representational space 
of Chornobyl that disturb nuclear tourists. Soviet material culture instills ambivalent 
feelings among them, such as nostalgia that is associated with their carefree childhood, 
and resentment of Soviet modes of operation. Beyond other must-see objects such as 
the nuclear reactor and the town of Prypiat, there are several other sacred places in 
the Zone that attract the pilgrims. Among them is an object that presents cultural and 
historical interest for the local and international communities, known as Chornobyl-2 
or Duga (arch). Duga, a gigantic Soviet over-the-horizon radar system — a row of thirty 
Eiffel Towers in length silent monument to the Cold War, is currently on illegal tourist 
maps of the majority of those who travel to Chornobyl. Hundreds of people linger 
daily at the base of Duga, struck by its size and grandeur. The discussion about its 
construction and its location were politicized before Duga emerged as a military object. 
The political space of Duga has been sustained throughout Ukraine’s independence 
and was reinforced by the stalkers.94
In 1976, the Soviets erected a facility in close proximity to the reactor, a strategically 
important part of the Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) early-warning network, which had 
its own staff and infrastructure. Duga operated until December 1989 when the authorities 
largely abandoned it. The operating radar was extremely powerful and produced a very 
distinct and sharp sound, which became known in the West as the Russian Woodpecker — 
a repetitive tapping noise at 10 Hz that was identified by shortwave listeners in northern 
America. The height of this structure is 150 meters, and the length approximately 
460 meters. It is situated between what was, prior to the Chornobyl explosion, the villages 
of Kopachi and Dibrova. The fenced and secret place was identified as a “pioneer camp” 
on Soviet maps. The discovery of Duga by tourists opened up territory for speculation, 
myths, and new narratives about the Chornobyl explosion.
Duga was designed as an early warning long-range radar or an object-detection 
system for outer space surveillance to identify guided missiles and other moving 
objects behind the line of the horizon. This innovation was presented in 1947 by the 
Soviet scientist Nikolai Kabanov, an associate of the secret Scientific Research Institute 
no. 16.95 However, the practical application of this project is associated with the scientist 
92 Private communication with Fedir Oleksandrovych (FB; May 3, 2017).
93 On trauma management, and its links to the issues of human security, identity, and suffering, 
see Ekatherina Zhukova, “Trauma Management: Chernobyl in Belarus and Ukraine,” British 
Journal of Sociology 67.2 (2016): 195–215.
94 Even recently, Duga’s political space has been reaffirmed as some unknown activists of pro-
communist views managed to install a gigantic red flag on the very top of Duga. See Stepanets 
et al., Chernobylskaia zona, 169, 170.
95 For more details about the history of radar, and the physics of the radar’s functions and 
mechanisms, see A. A. Kostenko, A. I. Nosich, and I. A. Tishchenko, “Radar Prehistory, Soviet 
Side,” IEEE XPlore, August 7, 2002, accessed August 18, 2018, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/
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and radio engineer Yefim Shtyren and his closest associate Vasilii Shamshin who later 
became Minister of Communications of the USSR.96
In November 1962, because of the escalation of the Cold War and the construction 
of advanced ballistic missiles by the US, the TsK and the Council of Ministers of the 
USSR signed a number of decrees about the creation of an effective surveillance system 
of outer space. These decrees facilitated the emergence of several research institutions 
and construction firms working on early detection of launched intercontinental 
ballistic missiles. “Duga-1,” an over-horizon radio locator, was produced by one of these 
institutes, the Scientific Institute of Long-Distance Radio Communication (NII DAR), 
headed by Fiodor Lukin and Yefim Shtyren. The first experimental radar, constructed 
in 1964 near the village of Kalynivka in the Mykolaiiv oblast (Ukraine), was able to 
detect a rocket launched 3,000 kilometers away from the Soviet kosmodrom Baikonur. 
In June 1965, the authorities decided to build an experimental truncated version of 
the radar system “Duga-2” in Kalynivka and by late 1966 the project was completed. 
Although the testing period was rather short and the reliability of the system was not 
completely clear, the Soviet government made a decision to construct a more advanced 
“Duga” system in Chornobyl (Ukraine) and Komsomolsk-na-Amure (Russia). The radar 
in Chornobyl was oriented toward northern America through the North Pole, and the 
system was supposed to detect single and multiple targets within 9,000 kilometers.97 
Early detection of launched missiles provided the Soviets with a response time of 
approximately 30 minutes to neutralize a target.
document/959396/; Raymond C. Watson, Jr., Radar Origins Worldwide: History of Its Evolution 
in 13 Nations through World War II (Bloomingtom, IN: Trafford Publishing, 2009); John Erickson, 
“Radio-Location and the Air Defense Problem: The Design and Development of Soviet 
Radar,” Science Studies 2.3 (1972): 241–63; Robert Morris Page, The Origin of Radar (New York: 
Doubleday Anchor, 1962); Greg Goebel, “The British Invention of Radar,” Airvectors, accessed 
August 17, 2018, http://vc.airvectors.net/ttwiz_01.html; V. S. Kristal, Optimalnaia obrabotka 
radiolokatsionnykh signalov [An Optimal Analysis of Radiolocation Signals], Urss.ru, 2014, 
accessed August 18, 2018, http://urss.ru/PDF/add_ru/189302–1.pdf; “Chernobyl-2, on zhe ZGRLS 
‘Duga’ [Chornobyl-2, or the ZGRLS ‘Duga’],” Livejournal (Masterok), April 28, 2013, accessed 
August, 2018, http://masterok.livejournal.com/918653.html.
96 In designing a powerful over-horizon radar, they were assisted by young Soviet scientists Efir 
Shustov and Boris Kukis. See Shamshin’s biography in “Vasilii Shamshin,” Peoples.ru, accessed 
August 15, 2018, http://www.peoples.ru/state/minister/russia/vasiliy_shamshin/; Aleksandr 
Babakin, “Zagorizontnaia epopeia [An Over-Horizon Epopee],” Vozdushno-kosmicheskaia 
oborona, January 1, 2001, accessed August 15, 2018, militaryrussia.ru/forum/download/file.
php?id=39915.
97 The most knowledgeable radar engineers contributed to the final design of the system — 
Frants Kuzminskii, Vladimir Vasiukov, Vasilii Shamshin, Yefim Shtyren and Efir Shustov. 
“Radiolokatsionnye stantsii razvedki dalnego obnaruzheniia [Radiolocation Surveillance 
Stations for Distant Monitoring],” Sovershenno Sekretno – Osobaia Papka, February 20, 
2016, accessed August 17, 2018, http://ss-op.ru/reviews/view/61; “Chernobyl-2,” Livejournal 
(Masterok).
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The first series of testing electromagnetic signals from Chornobyl-2 was launched 
on July 4, 1976, and was detected immediately not only by special surveillance 
equipment but also by amateur radio operators all over the globe. The Russian 
Woodpecker employed radio frequencies that were guarded by international treaties 
on radio propagation, including the international bandplan and interference rules for 
medium wave AM broadcasting.98 Not surprisingly, the Soviet government dismissed 
complaints by the U. S., British and Canadian governments about the Russians violating 
these treaties. Soviet officials also mocked the theories of the powerful psychotropic 
effect of the signals on people’s behavior which, according to some claims advanced 
by the West, were able to control people’s actions and thoughts.99
The most fascinating aspect of the monster object is that the system, carefully 
designed by the most brilliant Soviet scientists, was dysfunctional at its birth. In other 
words, the radar whose construction and installation cost approximately seven billion 
rubles was largely ineffective.100 To simplify the matter, the system could not function 
smoothly because of the systematic interference of a natural phenomenon — the 
Northern Lights. The dissonance between substantial investments into this project by 
the Soviets and Duga’s a priori dysfunctionality advanced Oleksandrovych’s suspicion. 
A frequent guest at Duga, he launched a private investigation of the Chornobyl accident 
which seemed mysterious to him. Duga and its unfortunate history became part of his 
narrative about the possible causes of the Chornobyl disaster.
After collecting oral histories from those who worked for Duga and the AES before 
the accident, Oleksandrovych concluded that the Chornobyl explosion was a carefully 
designed plan which was executed by Moscow to protect Vasilii Shamshin, a Moscow 
bureaucrat who was one of the founders of the radar system, including Chornobyl-2. 
According to Oleksandrovych, the visit of a Moscow commission to Chornobyl-2 that 
had been scheduled immediately after the explosion of Unit 4 never materialized 
because of the disaster. The flaws of the radar system were about to be discovered and 
someone would have to pay for the unprecedented waste of resources invested in the 
project without sufficient theoretical preparation and by skipping the most crucial 
experimental stages of the project.101 Oleksandrovych’s supposition that the explosion 
was a cover up operation designed in Moscow has been explained in the documentary 
98 For a discussion about these international agreements, see Edward Wenk, Jr., Making Waves: 
Engineering, Politics, and the Social Management of Technology (Urbana; Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 1995), 62–66. A bandplan refers to the modes and types of allocations within each 
range of frequencies, and is typically set by international agreements, national regulations, or 
agreements between amateur radio operators.
99 See the images of Chernobyl-2 in Stepanets et al., Chernobylskaia zona, 150–71.
100 “Sekretnyi obekt ‘Chernobyl-2’ raskryl svoi tainy [The Secret Object ‘Chornobyl-2’ Revealed 
Its Secrets],” InoTV, April 22, 2011, accessed August 15, 2018, https://russian.rt.com/
inotv/2011–04–22/Sekretnaya-laboratoriya-CHernobilya-raskrila-svoi.
101 Ksenia Kirillova, “Chernobylskuiu AES vzorvali po prikazu iz Moskvy? [Was the Chornobyl AES 
Blown up on Moscow’s Order?],” Vse Media, March 31, 2016, accessed August 15, 2018, http://vse.
media/chernobyilskuyu-aes-vzorvali-po-prikazu-iz-moskvyi/.
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The Russian Woodpecker, which remains only a supposition. It seems to be consistent 
with Kravchuk’s analysis, although sceptics reject both attempts at challenging the 
official accidental version of the tragedy, rightfully identifying them as speculations. 
Without solid evidence, Oleksandrovych’s theory about the causes of the Chornobyl 
accident seems to fall into the category of conspiracy theories that naturally emerge 
in societies in which the truth is chronically concealed and suppressed. But what is 
remarkable about Oleksandrovych’s narrative is that it connotes the drama of children 
born in the early and mid-1980s who were displaced to sanatoriums and orphanages 
and who today, as adults, seek an answer to the question — why? “Their childhood was 
stolen from them”; they had to grow up in places other than their native lands, another 
stalker explains.102
Omitting, however, the context and the content of conspiracy theory discussions, 
Oleksandrovych’s search for truth was certainly inherited from other Ukrainians 
whose aspirations to learn more about Ukraine’s past and their hunger for truth were 
formed during the Khrushchev Thaw. Thirty years ago, in his poem “Mii Chornobyl” 
(My  Chornobyl), the Ukrainian poet Robert Tretiakov denounced state nuclear 
violence and lies that accompanied it. He rejected the possibility of the Ukrainians’ 
collective death. He refused to search for analogies and rhymes for Chornobyls and 
Hiroshimas, and lamented that his own life and values did not exemplify the highest 
moral principle — the truth.103 Similarly, a decade later, in 1996, Dmytro Pavlychko has 
posited that
the Chornobyl tragedy is the result of the supremacy of the system 
of lies that was the basis of the Russian-Soviet empire. Lies were 
pandemic. Children considered themselves the happiest children 
in the world. Academics believed that the wisdom of the world lay 
in the quotations from Lenin’s and Marx’s works. Although slaves, 
[Soviet] peoples considered themselves free. Yet one could not 
force the atom to lie! It took revenge for people placing it in horrific 
conditions of survival. The reason for the Chornobyl tragedy were 
the humiliating and deceptive circumstances of human life.104
In tune with his predecessors, Oleksandrovych insists that today’s Ukraine 
absorbed the Soviet legacies and lies, becoming routine and invisible like radiation and 
devouring people from the inside. He referred to Chornobyl as the “atomic heart of the 
USSR” and to Duga as “the eye of Moscow” whose powers circulated through the minds 
of the Ukrainians, through local politics, and through Ukraine’s history and culture as 
102 Stepanets et al., Chernobylskaia zona, 138.
103 Robert Tretiakov, Vybrana liryka [Selected Lyrics] (Kharkiv: Maidan, 1995), 50.
104 Dmytro Pavlychko, Holosy moho zhyttia: Statti, vystupy, interviu. Dokumenty [The Voices of My 
Life: Articles, Talks, Interviews. Documents] (Kyiv: Osnovy, 2013), 433.
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a whole.105 He gravitates toward the idea that Chornobyl was a pre-planned unsolved 
crime which perpetuated violence, secretiveness, and uncertainty in contemporary 
Ukraine. According to Oleksandrovych, Soviet traditions and technologies of terrorism, 
intimidation, fear, and chaos imported from the Kremlin are very much alive and active 
in Ukraine, and their roots should be traced to the Soviet era and the events of 1986.106 
During the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity in 2013–2014, Oleksandrovych insisted that 
the Soviet Union was coming back, predicting in late December of 2013 the Russian 
invasion of Ukraine.107
Crucially, the political vigor of the Zone invites young Ukrainians to revisit the 
Soviet past, and regardless of their beliefs, they thoroughly document the vanishing 
Soviet culture, creating a gallery of images, paintings, and texts. Moreover, the 
most faithful pilgrims create a visual history of each location in the Zone, which 
demonstrates the gradual destruction and deterioration of the Zone’s material culture 
and the evidence of Soviet politics embedded in it. The forces of nature, vandalism, 
and the activities of marauders inevitably change the look of the Zone. But its images 
persistently captured by the stalkers sustain the truth about Ukraine’s colonial 
past. Stepanets left for humanity his unique photos of the site and a written spatial 
history of the place; Kamysh shared his impressions about the Zone through original 
prose that simultaneously constituted a literary text and a historical document; and 
Oleksandrovych provided us with his vision of the Zone and his dazzling art which 
through the flames of Chornobyl established a conceptual and mnemonic connection 
between the Soviet past and Ukraine’s present and future.
The pilgrimage to the Zone indeed transformed Chornobyl into an open air 
museum. Its aesthetics and politics produced a new culture, which escapes from 
the panopticistic culture of conventional museums and exhibitions. Through the 
stalkers’ eyes and activities, this unusual museum opened up to the world the archaic 
technology associated with Soviet modernity, and its ideological contents consistent 
with imperial practices, namely — control, terror, surveillance, and corruption. 
Importantly, this museum encourages people to see beyond objects, such as the 
destroyed town of Prypiat and the failed towers of Duga (“the king of Anti-nature,” 
using Lina Kostenko’s metaphor). The space of this open air museum is akin to an 
interactive map that provides images with answers embedded in them. This space has 
shaped Oleksandrovych’s art, Stepanets’s dispositions, and Kamysh’s self-expression 
and has defined who they are, but most importantly, it has provided them with an 
opportunity to make a personal choice, an impossible prospect when this space was 
105 Katerina Lebedeva, “Rezhiser filma ‘Russkii diatel’ Grasia: Avariia na ChAES sviazana 
s Yevromaidanom [The Director of the Documentary ‘Russian Woodpecker’ Gracia: 
The Explosion at the AES Is Linked to the Euromaidan],” Gordon, May 11, 2015, accessed August 
14, 2018, http://gordonua.com/publications/rezhisser-filma-russkiy-dyatel-chad-grasia-avariya-
na-chaes-svyazana-s-evromaydanom-79401.html.
106 Kirillova, “Chernobylskuiu AES”; Lebedeva, “Rezhiser filma ‘Russkii diatel.’”
107 See Chad Gracia’s interview in Lebedeva, “Rezhiser filma ‘Russkii diatel.’”
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Soviet. The majority of stalkers have become nationally conscious patriots, joining the 
demonstrators at the Kyiv Maidan during the 2013–2014 Revolution of Dignity.
Epilogue
The stalkers offer us intimate knowledge about one of the most famous “spontaneous” 
open air museums in the world — Chornobyl. They provide us with what Clifford Geertz 
would identify as a “thick description” of the place and its artifacts, extending our 
imagination about people’s suffering during the era of Chornobyl and thus enhancing 
our understandings of the larger Soviet culture of which many of us were a part.108 By 
intellectually and physically returning to the desolate Exclusion Zone, they sought to 
discover its meaning, and the truth about the nuclear cataclysm and Ukraine’s history, 
a move provoked by their family backgrounds and their individual tragic memories 
of the past. But as many stalkers repeated on several occasions, having sought the 
meaning of the place, they discovered something different, no less important. Through 
their personal experiences in Chornobyl, they discovered their new identities and new 
creative impulses that inspired and shaped their lives and art. Their creative writings 
and paintings reflect the unsayable — the horror of a nuclear disaster, offering the 
emotional cartography of the place. Their trips to Ukraine’s past, where time seems 
to stop in 1986, allowed them to more acutely perceive their present, and to imagine 
their future.
The aesthetics and politics, intrinsic elements of this place, invite the stalkers to 
follow in the steps of Shcherbak, Alexievich, Kovalevska and many other intellectuals 
whose texts attempted to predict Ukraine’s post-Chornobyl future and to accurately 
convey the degree of suffering of those who worked on the front line dealing with 
the early stage of the catastrophe. When in the autumn of 1986 Shcherbak visited the 
Poliskyi district (the villages of Vilcha and Zelena Poliana), he realized that he was 
looking into the eyes of the future with the “new demands of the atomic age [which] 
were entering the consciousness and daily life and customs of people.” 109 Geiger 
counters (dosimeters), displacement, human suffering, and feelings of uncertainty, 
insecurity, and frustration became part of people’s lives and the space in which they 
existed.110 Thirty years after the tragedy, we learned that the Chornobyl open air museum 
has a transnational meaning and that human suffering associated with Chornobyl is 
108 For the concepts of “thick description” and “local knowledge,” see Clifford Geertz, 
The Interpretation of Cultures (London: Fontana, 2000); and Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: 
Further Studies in Interpretive Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
109 Shcherbak, Chernobyl, 4. Similarly, David R. Marples attempted to see the future through 
the prism of Chornobyl. He was correct, arguing in 1986 that Chornobyl would not be the last 
such nuclear disaster. See Marples, Chernobyl and Nuclear Power in the USSR, 180.
110 Adriana Petryna identified these uncertainties as “new biological uncertainties.” For a related 
concept of “biological citizenship,” see Adriana Petryna, Life Exposed: Biological Citizens after 
Chernobyl (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002).
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not locked in the past — it transcends space and time, becoming part of a history of 
state nuclear violence associated with inhumanity and the cynicism of non-democratic 
regimes.
Importantly, Chornobyl, its landscape and history contributed to the coherence 
of self-identification of people like Stepanets, Kamysh, and Oleksandrovych. At 
the moment of crisis, such as the Ukrainian revolution of 2013–2014, their self-
identifications were enlightened by patriotic feelings and anti-imperial sentiments that 
were amplified by the Soviet production of the lifeless space observed in Chornobyl. 
Beyond intellectual commitment and efforts invested in research, and environmental 
and political activism, the stalkers strive to liberate themselves from spatial and mental 
enclosures, torturous memories, and the “ghosts of the Soviet past,” as Oleksandrovych 
has characterized his own quest for the truth about Chornobyl and his own identity. The 
historicity and the material culture of Chornobyl enhance the stalkers’ acute awareness 
of the pervasiveness of Soviet legacies, reducing the possibility of the subversion of their 
identities. They persistently search for closure, which ultimately implies freedom from 
oppressive state and nuclear violence. Like for Alexievich, who identified Chornobyl 
as a mystery for the twenty first century, and for the British writer and historian Piers 
Paul Read, who argued that “the consequences of the accident remained as uncertain 
Courtesy of Kyrylo Stepanets. The Zone
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as the cause,” for the stalkers, any historical interpretation of Chornobyl is fraught with 
incompletion, inaccuracy, and uncertainty.111
Over the past decade, illegal nuclear tourists mastered and appropriated the 
Chornobyl Zone, transforming it into a museum and a representational space which 
human imagination seeks to change, understand and explain. This place lives through 
its images and symbols, constantly changing through the spatial practices of its 
inhabitants.112 Ruminating about representational space, Lefebvre has suggested that 
it is always alive, because it speaks: “it may be directional, situational or relational, 
because it is essentially qualitative, fluid and dynamic.” 113 As we have seen, the Zone is 
fluid, in turn changing people’s views and perceptions and inviting them to take a look 
at history in a new light. Precisely this factor incites us to study not only the history 
of this open air museum but also the history of its representations in conjunction 
with human practices and ideology. The products of representational spaces such 
as Chornobyl are unique symbolic works that form new aesthetic and ideological 
trends in society. Importantly, these works signify the polysemic exploration of 
human limitations, power, and inner self, an exercise that, among other things, helps 
transmit knowledge about secret and regimented places such as the Chornobyl open 
air museum. The producers of its contested space, the stalkers, offer their audiences a 
choice — to embrace or reject it.
Critically, through persistence, art, and pilgrimage to the Zone, the stalkers 
keep dead towns, like Prypiat, and memories about them alive. They make Prypiat 
worth something — at the very least, worth remembering.114 The Chornobyl open air 
museum is a legally closed area and a dangerous place, and its rigid rules established 
by the authorities and nature certainly regiment people’s behavior there, no matter 
how free the stalkers feel there. However, its vanishing material culture, mystery, and 
unpredictability continue to lure them to examine the roots of their fears, anxieties, and 
uncertainties, which appears to be the only way to free themselves. “Life is a challenge 
and often dictates where to walk, how to live, and what air to breath,” but only in 
the Zone “life is not passing by me,” Kamysh has ruminated.115 People, like Kamysh, 
experience history as nostalgia and the future as freedom, creating their own rules in 
the Zone and a new code of social behavior. For them, the Chornobyl open air museum 
is a horizon disappearing swiftly behind them, and through their routine trips to the 
Zone, they maintain its spatial and epistemological continuity.
Critics of open air museums who claim that such places lack authenticity and 
accuracy in recreating the past might discover an interesting phenomenon in the 
111 Piers Paul Read, Ablaze: The Story of the Heroes and Victims of Chernobyl  
(New York: Random House, 1992), 344.
112 For a discussion of the perceived-conceived-lived triad in spatial terms, see Lefebvre, 
The Production of Space, 38–46.
113 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 42.
114 Stepanets et al., Chernobylskaia zona, 211–12.
115 Kamysh, Oformliandiia, 105–07.
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Chornobyl case: the authenticity of this place’s past is unintentional and sustained 
through a “Brownian motion” of stalkers and nuclear tourists who historicize and 
preserve the dead surroundings of the AES by photographing, cartographing, exploring, 
discovering, and building, activities that facilitate the distribution of knowledge about 
one of the most secret objects in Soviet Ukraine.116 The initial accident, the tragedy of 
millions of people provoked by it, and the subsequent pilgrimage to the Chornobyl 
Zone have placed this museum on the map of human suffering, and its authenticity 
shines through millions of old and new photos of the Zone and its unearthing and tragic 
symbolic representations, serving as cultural bridges between generations. The cultural 
continuity of the Chornobyl museum is still awaiting more fundamental analyses, but its 
current spatial assessment reveals the significance of Chornobyl’s space for Ukrainians, 
which arms them with some code to a better understanding of the past and of the 
histories of individual lives, interrupted by the nuclear explosion in 1986.117 Possibly, 
future research will repackage, reconceive and rearticulate the story and the roots of the 
Chornobyl tragedy, but the full truth might never be learned. The only certainty about 
Chornobyl and the adjacent territories seems to be linked to temporal factors: these 
places are not going to be habitable for a long time where safe resettlement is possible.118 
As a consequence, Chornobyl will remain an open air museum for quite some time, 
attracting individuals longing for knowledge and freedom, and Chornobyl’s meaning 
will always be negotiated because, as is symptomatic of other places and times, there is 
no single “authentic” truth of the place.119 Ultimately, Chornobyl is polysemic in nature, 
always inviting interpretations.
116 In physics, Brownian motion refers to the random motion of particles suspended in a fluid 
resulting from their collision with the fast-moving molecules in the fluid.
117 Oksana Zabuzhko has ruminated about the mystery of individual lives that cannot be decoded 
through official documents and myths. An attempt at insight (a look from “inside”) is necessary 
to realize the myriads of “little things” that people usually take with them to the grave, when 
the code to understanding them is lost forever. See Zabuzhko, Muzei pokynutykh sekretiv, 32–33.
118 Andrew L. Jenks correctly argues that those who live even hundreds of kilometers from the 
reactor cannot be sure about the safety of their environments — “the truth [about the dangers 
of possible contamination] can never be known.” See Andrew L. Jenks, Perils of Progress: 
Environmental Disasters in the Twentieth Century (New York: Prentice Hall, 2011), 125. For a 
discussion about the deadly influence of radiation on human blood cells, see Kate Brown, 
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